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1. INTRODUCTION
w xIn 1971, L. S. Shapley 3 introduced the concept of a convex game and
showed that the Shapley value of the game lies in the core. Later, in 1993,
w xE. Inarra and J. M. Usategui 1 presented two classes of games calledÄ
average convex games and partially average convex games that strictly
contain convex games, and they showed that the Shapley values of these
games are in the cores.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of a totally convex game and
establish a necessary and sufficient condition under which the Shapley
value is in the core. It is easy to show that totally convex games contain
average convex games.
At last, we present an example to show that totally convex games strictly
include average convex games.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, let X be a nonempty set and let 2 X denote the
set of all subsets of X. We also denote by R and Rn the set of real
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numbers and the n-dimensional Euclidean space, respectively. Let n and k
be nonnegative integers with n G k. Then the binomial coefficients Cn k
are defined by
n!
C s ,n k n y k !k! .
where 0!s 1. An n-person game in characteristic function form is a pair
 .  4N, ¨ , where N s 1, 2, . . . , n is the set of players and ¨ is a real valued
N  .  .set function on 2 with ¨ B s 0. The set A of all imputations of N, ¨ is
defined by
A s x s x , x , . . . , x g Rn : .1 2 n
n
 4x s ¨ N and x G ¨ i for all i g N . .  . i i 5
is1
 .The core C of N, ¨ is also defined by
C s x s x , x , . . . , x g A : x G ¨ S for all S ; N , .  .1 2 n i 5
igS
i .  .where  x s 0 if S s B. For all S ; N and i g N, define ¨ S s ¨ Sig S i
  4.  .y ¨ S_ i . Then the Shapley value f s f , f , . . . , f of the game1 2 n
 . w xN, ¨ is defined as follows 2 ,
s y 1 ! n y s ! .  .
if s ¨ S for each i g N , .i n!S;N
where s is the number of players in S and the summation  is takenS ; N
w xover all nonempty subsets S of N. It is well known 2 that for every game
 .N, ¨ ,
f s ¨ N . . i
igN
 .For every nonempty set T ; N, T , ¨ is called a subgame of a game0
 . T  .N, ¨ , where ¨ is the restriction of ¨ to 2 . If T , ¨ is a subgame of a0 0
 . T  .game N, ¨ , then we denote by f the Shapley value of T , ¨ . A game0
 . w xN, ¨ is called convex 3 if for any nonempty set B ; N,
 4  4¨ A j B y ¨ B G ¨ A j B_ i y ¨ B_ i .  .  .  . .
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for all i g N and A ; N with i g B ; N _ A, or equivalently, for any
nonempty set S ; N,
¨ i T G ¨ i S for all i g N and T ; N with i g S ; T . .  .
 . w xA game N, ¨ is called average convex 1 if for any nonempty set B ; N,
1
 4  4¨ A j B y ¨ B G ¨ A j B_ i y ¨ B_ i .  .  .  . .b igB
for all A ; N with A l B s B.
3. THE TOTALLY CONVEX GAMES
In this section, we introduce the concept of a totally convex game and
establish a necessary and sufficient condition under which the Shapley
value of the game lies in the core. Before establishing it, we prove the
following lemma.
LEMMA. For all positi¨ e integers n, k, m with n y k G m,
kqm C nk sym s . C n y k C . nyky1ny1 sy1 my1ssm
Proof. We shall prove it by mathematical induction. If k s 1 and
n y 1 G m G 1, we have
mq1 C C C1 sym 1 0 1 1s q C C Cny1 sy1 ny1 my1 ny1 mssm
1 m
s q
C n y m C . ny1ny1 my1 my1
n
s
n y m C . ny1 my1
n
s .
n y 1 C . ny2 my1
Suppose that the equality holds for k s t y 1 with t G 2 and n, m with
 .n y t y 1 G m G 1. Then for k s t and n, m with n y t G m G 1, we
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have
mqt mqty1C C C Ct sym t 0 t sym t ts q q C C C Cny1 sy1 ny1 my1 ny1 sy1 ny1 mqty1ssm ssmq1
mqty1C Cty1 0 ty1 syms q C Cny1 my1 ny1 sy1ssmq1
mqty1 C Cty1 symq1. ty1 ty1q q C Cny1 sy1 ny1 mqty1ssmq1
mqty1 mqtC Cty1 sym ty1 symq1.s q C Cny1 sy1 ny1 sy1ssm ssmq1
mqty1 mq1qty1C Cty1 sym ty1 symq1.s q C Cny1 sy1 ny1 sy1ssm ssmq1
n n
s q
n y t q 1 C n y t q 1 C .  .ny t nytmy1 m
n m y 1 ! n y m y t q 1 ! nm! n y m y t ! .  .  .
s q
n y t q 1 ! n y t q 1 ! .  .
n m y 1 ! n y m y t ! n y t q 1 .  .  .
s
n y t q 1 ! .
n m y 1 ! n y m y t ! .  .
s
n y t ! .
n
s .
n y t C . ny ty1 my1
This completes the proof.
Now we can establish a necessary and sufficient condition under which
the Shapley value of a game lies in the core.
 .DEFINITION. A game N, ¨ is totally convex if for any subset T of N,
s y 1 ! n y s ! .  .
i i¨ S y ¨ S l T G 0, .  .  n!S;N igSlT
where the summation  is taken over all nonempty subsets S of NS ; N
w i . i .xand  ¨ S y ¨ S l T s 0 if S l T s B.ig S l T
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 .THEOREM. Let N, ¨ be an n-person game. Then the Shapley ¨alue of
 .  .N, ¨ lies in the core if and only if the game N, ¨ is totally con¨ex.
 .Proof. Let N, ¨ be a totally convex game and let T be a nonempty
subset of N. Then, for any R ; T and a positive integer s with n y t q r
< < < <G s G R s r, the number of all S ; N such that S l T s R and S s s
is C . So, we haveny t syr
s y 1 ! n y s ! .  .
if s ¨ S .  i n!igT igT S;N
1
is ¨ S .  n Cny1 sy1igT S;N
1
is ¨ S . n Cny1 sy1S;N igSlT
1
iG ¨ S l T . n Cny1 sy1S;N igSlT
nytqr Cny t syr is ¨ R .  n Cny1 sy1ssrR;T igR
1
is ¨ R by Lemma .  . t Cty1 ry1R;T igR
1
is ¨ R .  t Cty1 ry1igT R;T
s fT i
igT
s ¨ T . .
 .If T s B, we have 0 s  f s ¨ T . We also know that  f sig T i ig N i
 .  .¨ N . Therefore the Shapley value f of N, ¨ lies in the core. Conversely,
 .if the Shapley value f of a game N, ¨ lies in the core, then it is obvious
from the above inequality that the game is totally convex.
We can prove that an average convex game is totally convex. If a game
 .N, ¨ is average convex, then for all A, B ; N with A l B s f, we have
 4  4b¨ A j B y b¨ B G ¨ A j B _ i y ¨ B_ i , .  .  . .  .
igB
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and hence
¨ i A j B G ¨ i B . .  . 
igB igB
For all S, T ; N, let A s S_T and B s S l T. Then, we have
i i¨ S y ¨ S l T G 0. .  .
igSlT
So, for any T ; N, we have
s y 1 ! n y s ! .  .
i i¨ S y ¨ S l T G 0. .  . n!S;N igSlT
Therefore, it is totally convex.
 .EXAMPLE. Consider the 3-person game N, ¨ with a characteristic
function ¨ given by
 4  4  4¨ B s ¨ 1 s ¨ 2 s ¨ 3 s 0, .  .  .  .
 4  4  4¨ 1, 2 s 5, ¨ 1, 3 s ¨ 2, 3 s 7, .  .  .
and
¨ N s 10. .
It is not difficult to check that this is a totally convex game. But this game
 4  4is not average convex. In fact, let A s 1 and B s 2, 3 . Then
1
 4  43 s ¨ A j B y ¨ B - ¨ A j B_ i y ¨ B_ i .  .  .  . .2 igB
s 6.
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